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Abstract: 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether depressed 
(vs non-depressed) adults showed differences in cortical activation in response to stimuli 
representing personal goals. Drawing upon regulatory focus theory as well as previous research, 
we predicted that depressed patients would manifest attenuated left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
activation in response to their own promotion goals as well as exaggerated right OFC activation 
in response to their own prevention goals. Unmedicated adults with major depression (n = 22) 
and adults with no history of affective disorder (n = 14) completed questionnaires and a personal 
goal interview. Several weeks later, they were scanned during a judgment task which (unknown 
to them) included stimuli representing their promotion and prevention goals. Both groups 
showed similar patterns of task-related activation. Consistent with predictions, patients showed 
significantly decreased left OFC and increased right OFC activation compared to controls on 
trials in which they were exposed incidentally to their promotion and prevention goals, 
respectively. The results suggest that depression involves dysfunction in processing two 
important types of personal goals. The findings extend models of the etiology of depression to 
incorporate cognitive and motivational processes underlying higher order goal representation and 
ultimately may provide an empirical basis for treatment matching. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Unipolar depression is an episodic disorder characterized by decreased hedonic and motivational 
responsiveness to events previously associated with positive outcomes (Akiskal and 
McKinney, 1973; Depue and Iacono,1989). These symptoms implicate dysfunction of incentive 
motivation and positive affectivity (Watson et al., 1999) that involve alterations in cognition and 
neurophysiology via multiple brain pathways and circuits (Davidson et al., 2002; 
Mayberg, 2003). 
Although there is broad evidence that depression is associated with disruption of 
appetitive/approach motivation (Dickson and MacLeod,2004; McFarland et al., 2006), most 
studies of motivational deficits in depression have focused on temperament-based mechanisms 
for approach and avoidance (Fowles, 1988; Gray, 1994). However, recent studies also suggest 
that dysfunction of self-regulation, defined as the psychological and neurophysiological 
processes that underlie personal goal pursuit (Carver, 2004), constitutes both a risk factor for and 
a consequence of depression (Kasch et al., 2002). The present study tested the hypothesis that 
depression would be associated with dysfunction in neural mechanisms underlying the 
representation and processing of two important classes of personal goals. 
Regulatory focus theory (RFT) identifies two distinct classes of goals representing desired end-
states toward which people self-regulate (Higgins, 1997). The two types of goals are associated 
with different cognitive, motivational and strategic inclinations. Promotion goals involve 
accomplishment, advancement or aspiration—that is, ‘making good things 
happen’. Prevention goals involve security, safety or responsibility—that is, ‘keeping bad things 
from happening’. Pursuit of promotion and prevention goals involves strategic rather than 
spatiotemporal approach and avoidance respectively and can be activated intentionally as well as 
automatically (e.g. when a stimulus ‘primes’ a goal representation). RFT predicts that perceived 
progress toward a promotion goal is associated with feelings of happiness while perceived failure 
is associated with sadness and dejection; in contrast, perceived progress toward a prevention goal 
leads to quiescence while perceived failure leads to agitation and anxiety (Higgins et al., 1997). 
Chronic perceived failure to attain promotion goals is associated with depressive symptoms, 
whereas failure to attain prevention goals is associated with symptoms of anxiety 
(Strauman, 1992). The psychological mechanisms that underlie pursuit of promotion and 
prevention goals emerge during development primarily as a function of socialization (Manian et 
al., 2006) and can be distinguished reliably from the temperament-based mechanisms described 
in biobehavioral theories of approach and avoidance (Strauman and Wilson, in press). 
Although there is considerable evidence from behavioral studies supporting the predictions of 
RFT regarding promotion and prevention goal pursuit, data regarding the neural correlates of 
promotion/prevention goal activation are just beginning to appear. Using EEG, Amodio and 
colleagues (2004) found that chronic promotion focus was associated with greater left frontal 
activity while chronic prevention focus was associated with greater right frontal activity. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Cunningham et al. (2005) found that individual 
differences in promotion/prevention focus were associated with patterns of neural activation in 
response to a valence judgment task. In a recent study, we used fMRI to identify brain regions 
activated during incidental priming of promotion and prevention goals (Eddington et al., 2007). 
Based on evidence of cortical asymmetry associated with individual differences in regulatory 
focus (Amodio et al., 2004), we predicted that promotion and prevention goal priming would be 
associated with activation in the left and right orbitofrontal cortices (OFC), respectively. 
Promotion goal priming discriminantly activated a region of left OFC (BA 11), and variability in 
activation of this region following promotion goal priming was correlated with individual 
differences in the strength of participants’ self-reported orientation to promotion goals. 
To our knowledge, the Eddington et al. study was the first to use fMRI to link idiographically 
assessed personal goal representation and priming with changes in cerebral blood flow in the 
OFC—a region implicated in decision making, in performance monitoring and in representing 
the hedonic value of primary as well as abstract (secondary) reinforcers (Kringelbach, 2005). 
Furthermore, the left OFC activation following promotion goal priming was detected while 
participants were performing a task unrelated to personal goal pursuit, supporting the postulate of 
RFT that promotion and prevention goals, as highly accessible knowledge structures, can be 
activated implicitly. Other investigators have found evidence linking OFC with goal-pursuit-
related cognitive and motivational processes such as integrating information regarding the 
current state of the organism with previously acquired social knowledge in order to guide 
behavioral choices and strategies (Furuyashiki and Gallagher, 2007; Petrides, 2007). Thus, the 
OFC may be an important component of a neural system that instantiates personal goal 
representations and, via interactions with other brain regions, determines incentive values and 
guides hierarchically organized goal-directed behaviors (Holland and Gallagher, 2004). 
If promotion goal priming is associated with left OFC activation, and individuals experiencing 
chronic failure to attain promotion goals are vulnerable to depressive symptoms, then depression 
might be characterized by a dysfunction in left OFC activation following promotion goal 
priming. Such a deficit would be consistent with behavioral findings linking chronic perceived 
failure in promotion goal pursuit with vulnerability to depression (Strauman, 2002), as well as 
with the observation that compared with nondepressed controls, depressed individuals manifest 
decreased left OFC activation in response to affectively salient visual stimuli (Tremblay et 
al., 2005). In addition, recent clinical data indicated that a self-regulation-based treatment was 
differentially efficacious for patients diagnosed with primary major depressive disorder or 
dysthymic disorder characterized by chronically poor promotion goal pursuit (Strauman et 
al., 2006). 
In the current study, we hypothesized that incidental priming of promotion goals during a social 
judgment task would reliably induce left OFC activation among individuals with no history of 
depression (replicating the findings of Eddington et al.), but that depressed patients would show 
an attenuated left OFC response to promotion goal priming. We also hypothesized, consistent 
with previous studies showing frontal asymmetry related to negative/positive affectivity (Allen 
and Kline, 2004; Davidson,2004) and with recent perspectives on depressive/anxious 
comorbidity (Strauman, 2002; Watson, 2005), that priming prevention goals would lead to 
increased activation in the right PFC in depressed patients, reflecting compensatory 
hypersensitivity to prevention goals due to hypoactivation of promotion goals (Strauman, 2002). 
Finally, we predicted that despite these differences in response to personal goal priming, the two 
participant groups would show similar patterns of cortical activation in response to the judgment 
task itself. 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Participants 
Participants were 24 adults (mean age, 36 years; 62% female) with current major depressive 
disorder who were part of a larger study, and 16 adults (mean age, 35.6 years; 63% female) with 
no personal or family history of any affective disorder. Participants in both groups met the 
following criteria: right-handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Scale 
(Oldfield, 1971); no history of neurological disorder or head trauma; no cognitive impairment; 
not currently taking any medications for depression (including herbal remedies or anti-
depressants used for other indications); not pregnant; and no implanted metal or other medical 
devices/conditions that were contraindicated with MRI. 
Depressed patients met DSM-IV criteria for current major depressive disorder (and scored above 
19 on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) with no history of mania, psychosis or 
borderline or anti-social personality disorders. Comorbid Axis I diagnoses were acceptable as 
long as the current depressive episode was primary. Depression severity was moderate on 
average, with a mean Hamilton score of 26.8. 
Participants were recruited primarily through referrals (for the depressed group) and 
advertisements. The participants in the non-depressed control group were matched on age and 
gender to the first 16 depressed participants who enrolled in the study. Participants received 
monetary compensation for all assessments. After a complete description of the study was 
provided, written informed consent was obtained. Data from four subjects (two in each group) 
were discarded due to artifacts or technical problems during the fMRI scanning session. 
Therefore, the results reported below were based on a final sample of 22 depressed patients and 
14 non-depressed controls. 
Pre-scan assessments 
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID) 
Participants were interviewed by an advanced clinical psychology trainee using the SCID-I 
(First et al., 1995). Family history of affective disorders was also assessed in the non-depressed 
group via participant self-report. Two potential non-depressed group participants were excluded 
due to a reported history of maternal depression. 
Selves Questionnaire—interview format 
An interview version of the Selves Questionnaire (SQ), a free-response measure that asks 
participants to describe attributes in three domains of self-beliefs (actual, ideal and ought; 
Higgins et al., 1986), was administered individually. Ideal self-beliefs represent promotion goals, 
whereas ought self-beliefs represent prevention goals. The interview included both the 
participant's own beliefs as well as beliefs concerning the standpoint of significant others. For 
example, the question, ‘What are the attributes of the type of person you ideally would like to 
be?’ is intended to elicit the participant's own-standpoint promotion goals. 
Depression measure 
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) is a clinician rating scale for depression 
(Hamilton, 1967) that was completed following the SCID interview by an advanced clinical 
psychology trainee. 
Goal priming task 
The priming task was conducted ∼3 weeks after the pre-scan assessment. Unknown to the 
participants, the priming task used an idiographically generated set of stimuli based in part on 
participants’ unique responses to the SQ. Promotion and prevention goal primes were selected 
from among the ideal and ought attributes, respectively (a total of four selected from 
across own and other standpoint for each goal type). Single-word attributes with 2–5 syllables 
were chosen to be unique to the goal domain and to include as many self-discrepant attributes as 
possible. Yoked-control primes were selected from the ideal and ought attributes of other 
participants (and so were positively valenced as well) and were semantically unrelated to any 
attribute generated by the target participant. 
Stimuli were presented in an event-related design in the context of a judgment task used in 
previous studies (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al.,2002). Four judgment conditions were 
presented in four blocks in the following order: (1) ‘Rate how well the adjective describes you’, 
(2) ‘Rate how well the adjective describes Oprah Winfrey’, (3) ‘Rate how socially desirable the 
adjective is’ and (4) ‘Indicate how many syllables the word has’. Responses were recorded on a 
button box with four buttons corresponding to the following ratings for the first three 
blocks: almost always, most of the time, rarely, and never. For the syllables task, the buttons 
corresponded to 2, 3, 4 or 5 syllables. Participants were told that the purpose of the task was to 
find out how people make different judgments about attributes. 
At the beginning of each block, participants had five practice words (not used in any of the 
analyses) which were the same for every participant and were semantically unrelated to any of 
the goal priming words. Following the practice words, the participants’ four promotion and four 
prevention goal priming words, as well as the eight control words, were presented in random 
order in each block. Thus, following the practice trials, these 16 words were repeated in random 
order for each block. Each word was presented for 2 s, with a jittered interstimulus interval 
(fixation cross) of 10, 12 or 14 s. Stimuli were presented using CIGAL, an in-house software 
program (Voyvodic, 1999). 
Neuroimaging protocol 
Images were acquired on a GE Signa 1.5T scanner (Waukesha, Wisconsin). Functional images 
were acquired using blood-oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast T2*-weighted spiral 
MRI (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 40 ms, flip angle = 90°, matrix = 642; in-plane resolution 3.92 mm), 
and consisted of volumes of 28 contiguous 4-mm (interleaved) slices, acquired parallel to the 
line connecting the anterior and posterior commissures. Prior to the functional acquisition, a T1-
weighted structural set including a 28-slice image (image dimensions 256 × 256 × 28; voxel size 
0.975 × 0.975 × 2) coplanar with the functionals was acquired for purposes of coregistration. 
Head motion was minimized by cushioning the subject's head and placing a strip of tape attached 
to the table across the subject's forehead. Stimuli were projected on a screen directly behind the 
subject's head within the scanner bore, which subjects viewed with mirrored glasses. Responses 
were recorded using a 4-button response box placed under the subject's right hand. 
fMRI data analysis 
MRI data were preprocessed using SPM99 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) and analyzed 
using in-house scripts programmed in MATLAB. Preprocessing consisted of typical steps: 
correction for slight differences in slice acquisition timing, realignment of images to the first 
functional image to correct for motion artifacts, co-registration of the first functional image with 
the high-resolution anatomical image, normalization of the anatomical and functional images to a 
standard stereotactic space (Montreal Neurological Institute or MNI), and smoothing of the 
functional images using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
A selective averaging approach was used to identify areas of activation associated with goal 
priming, and with the judgment task, in the two samples. This approach allowed for a finer 
dissociation of the signal on a timepoint-by-timepoint basis in the context of our event-related 
design, which involved long interstimulus intervals. Two main analyses were performed, the first 
testing our hypotheses regarding the goal priming conditions, and the second examining cortical 
areas activated by the judgment task that were common to the two participant groups. Both sets 
of analyses used custom software from the Duke-UNC Brain Imaging and Analysis Center to 
selectively average the fMRI signal in each subject for each of eight time points (one pre-
stimulus, one at stimulus onset, and six post-stimulus, with each equal to 2 s). These individual-
level analyses produced whole-brain t maps, which subsequently were combined in group-level 
random-effects analyses. 
Analyses of neural activity associated with goal priming combined the trials for each condition 
across the four task blocks. For individual-level analyses, the fMRI signal was selectively 
averaged in each subject for each of the eight time points separately, as a function of trial type 
(i.e. promotion goal, prevention goal and yoked control). The promotion and prevention 
conditions were then directly compared, to ensure that the resulting activation patterns 
reflect only the differences between promotion and prevention goals and not differences in self-
relevance or stimulus source (i.e. as with the yoked control words). 
For group analyses, voxel- and region-of-interest (ROI)-based random-effects analyses were 
performed for both the promotion (vs prevention) and prevention (vs promotion) contrasts. The 
results of these group analyses were masked with the main effect of interest to ensure that the 
results were attributable to an increase in activation in one group as opposed to a decrease in 
activation in the comparison group. Statistical results from the peak voxel (the voxel showing the 
strongest effect) and time point (defined in the range of 8–10 s following stimulus onset) from 
each analysis are reported. The analyses testing the a priori hypotheses regarding left and right 
OFC activity used a threshold of P < 0.05 to determine statistical significance (threshold for 
masking also was P < 0.05). Subsequent exploratory analyses outside the hypothesized brain 
regions used a more conservative threshold of P < 0.001. 
Analyses of cortical activation associated with the judgment task in the two groups combined 
across all three priming conditions (promotion, prevention and yoked control) and task blocks. 
Independent group analyses determined voxels where activity in response to the task was 
significantly greater than baseline (P < 0.01) at the peak, defined as 8 s after stimulus onset, 
separately in each group. To determine areas of common activation, the output of these separate 
analyses was then used as input for a subsequent conjunction analysis. The statistical 
significance of the resulting combined t maps was computed using Fisher's method of estimating 
the conjoint significance of independent tests (Fisher, 1950; Lazar et al., 2002), such that the 
conjoint significance threshold was P < 0.001. Finally, an extent threshold of five contiguous 
voxels was used in all analyses, and the results from the peak voxels and time points (i.e. the 
time point following stimulus onset where the maximum effects in the contrasts of interest were 
observed: 8–10 s) are reported. 
RESULTS 
Promotion and prevention goal priming: OFC results 
As predicted, for the promotion (vs prevention) goal priming condition comparison, the control 
group showed significant activation in an area of the left OFC (peak voxel x = 16, y = 27, z = 11, 
BA 11), whereas the depressed patients showed attenuated magnitude of activation in this region 
(Figure 1). The difference between the two groups was statistically significant, t(34) = 2.53, P < 
0.05. Moreover, consistent with our prediction for the prevention (vs promotion) goal priming 
condition comparison, the depressed group showed significant activation in an area of the right 
OFC (peak voxel x = 16, y = 38, z = 5, BA 10/11; Figure 1), whereas the control group did not. 
The difference between the two groups was statistically significant, t(34) = 3.47, P < 0.01. A 
group × hemisphere × condition repeated measures ANOVA also was conducted using the 
percent signal change data extracted from the peak time point and voxel in the left and right OFC 
areas; the three-way interaction approached statistical significance [F(1, 34) = 1.97, P < 0.10]. 
 
Fig. 1 Surface rendering of OFC activation in response to personal goal priming in depressed and 
control participants. The red cluster shows the location of the left OFC activation to 
promotionvs prevention goal priming for control > depressed (peak voxel x = 16, y = 27,z = 11, 
BA 11), and the blue cluster shows the right OFC activation to prevention vspromotion goal 
priming for depressed > control (peak voxel x = 16, y = 38, z = 5, BA 10/11). The bar graph 
shows the average percent signal change (% sc) at the peak voxels and time points; OFC, 
orbitofrontal cortex. 
We conducted additional analyses to determine whether severity of depressive symptoms was 
related to magnitude of activation in the identified left or right OFC site. Our hypotheses would 
predict that depression severity would be negatively correlated with left OFC activation in 
response to promotion goal priming and positively correlated with right OFC activation in 
response to prevention goal priming. Among the depressed patients, HRSD scores were 
significantly correlated with magnitude of activation at the peak time point from the peak right 
OFC voxel (r = 0.50; P < 0.05) but were not correlated with left OFC activation. 
Task-related activation 
To ensure that any group differences observed in response to promotionvs prevention goal 
priming were not attributable to differences in response to the task itself, we examined patterns 
of cortical activation related to the judgment task, combining across all priming trials and task 
blocks. As in previous studies, this analysis revealed a network of activation common to both 
groups that included frontal, parietal, temporal and occipital regions (Table 1). The frontal 
regions included both lateral (i.e. dorsolateral PFC—BA 4/6/9 and ventrolateral PFC—BA 
44/45/47, extending into insula—BA 13) and medial areas (i.e. anterior cingulate—BA 24/32, 
extending into the premotor cortex—BA 4/6/8). In the parietal lobe, there was bilateral activation 
in the somatosensory areas (i.e. BA 1, 2, 3 and 5), which was stronger and more widespread in 
the left hemisphere, and in more posterior areas (i.e. BA 7 and 40). The temporal lobe activation 
included posterior areas of the superior temporal gyrus (BA 22). Finally, in the occipital cortex, 
common activation was observed in both medial (BA 17/18) and lateral (BA 18/19/37) visual 
areas. 
Table 1 Results from exploratory analysis of group differences in activation associated with 
promotion and prevention goal priming 
Contrast Region Lat BA x y z t 
Promotion priming Ctl > Dep Parietal ctx R 40 59 −40 50 4.89a 
Promotion priming Dep > Ctl Inferior parietal ctx L 40/43 −51 −11 19 4.11a 
Prevention priming Ctl > Dep Lateral parietal ctx L 39 −51 −69 18 4.25a 
Prevention priming Dep > Ctl Motor ctx L 4/6 −40 −14 34 4.47a 
Ctx, cortex; Ctl, control group; Dep, depressed group; Lat, lateralization (L, left; R, right); BA, 
Brodmann area; x y z, Talairach coordinates (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988); t, t-value. 
aSignificant at P < 0.001. 
Promotion and prevention goal priming: exploratory analyses 
Finally, we conducted an exploratory whole-brain two-group analysis of the two 
promotion/prevention contrasts to identify other areas of activation associated with goal priming 
that distinguished the participant groups. This analysis yielded several areas showing dissociative 
responses to the priming conditions in the depressed vs non-depressed groups which had not 
been predicted a priori (Table 2). 




  Control group Depressed group 
Region  Lat BA x Y z t x y z t 
PFC Dorsolateral L 8/9 −51 10 40 6.5a −51 10 33 8.1a 
  R 6/8/9 55 10 36 5.5a 55 10 40 6.8a 
 Ventrolateral 
(Insula) 
L 45/47/13 −47 19 4 8.2a −36 20 6 7.0a 
  R 47/13 47 19 −4 7.9a 40 20 3 7.5a 
Premotor/Motor 
Ctx 
Lateral L 4/6 −36 −20 71 11.1a −36 −24 67 9.4a 
 Medial M 6 0 3 59 14.5a 0 −5 55 11.5a 
Parietal Ctx Inferior L 2/40 −63 −22 23 3.6b −63 −22 23 3.5b 
  R 2/40 59 −22 30 3.3b 59 −22 30 3.3b 
 Superior L 7 −28 −67 59 5.5a −28 −71 51 4.6a 
Auditory Ctx Superior R 21/22 63 −50 13 5.4a 63 −50 7 4.6a 
Visual Ctx Medial M 18 0 −96 5 6.9a 0 −99 12 6.8a 
 Bilateral L 18/19 −36 −74 −13 7.4a −39 −85 −2 7.0a 
  R 18/19 43 −63 −14 8.1a 40 −86 −13 4.7a 
Ctx, cortex; Lat, lateralization (L, left; R, right; M, medial); BA, Brodmann area; x y z, Talairach 
coordinates (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988); t, t-value. aSignificant at P < 0.001. bSignificant at 
P < 0.01. 
DISCUSSION 
Although depression has long been conceptualized as a disorder of motivation, the nature of that 
deficit has been understood primarily in terms of temperament-based mechanisms for 
spatiotemporal approach behaviors in response to appetitive cues. Research in social cognition 
provides a complementary perspective on depression, specifically on the potential impact of 
dysfunctions in personal goal pursuit. In this study, we used fMRI to examine responses of 
depressed and non-depressed adults to incidental priming of idiographically assessed promotion 
(‘making good things happen’) and prevention (‘keeping bad things from happening’) goals. 
Based on behavioral findings as well as recent studies in social cognitive neuroscience, we 
hypothesized that major depressive disorder would be associated with an attenuated left OFC 
response to incidental promotion goal priming, as well as an exaggerated right OFC response to 
prevention goal priming. 
The results supported our predictions. Whereas non-depressed adults manifested robust left OFC 
activation following exposure to their own promotion (vs prevention) goals (replicating previous 
findings), depressed individuals showed significantly less activation at that location. Conversely, 
compared to non-depressed participants, depressed patients showed significantly greater 
activation than controls in an area in right OFC following exposure to their own prevention 
(vs promotion) goals. Furthermore, among the depressed participants, severity of depressive 
symptoms was positively correlated with magnitude of activation in the right OFC. That is, more 
severely depressed participants showed stronger activation in the right OFC when exposed to 
their own prevention goals. Combining these observations, we postulate that depression is 
associated at both behavioral and neurobiological levels with down-regulation of promotion goal 
pursuit and simultaneous (and possibly compensatory) hyperresponsivity to prevention goals, 
consistent with a self-regulation-based model of depression (Strauman, 2002). These findings are 
also consistent with the notion of regulatory fit, that is, people tend to use goal pursuit strategies 
that fit with their motivational orientation, and they will experience stronger motivation when fit 
is higher (Higgins, 2000). Thus, the patterns of neural activation in response to goal priming may 
reflect depressed individuals’ stronger orientation toward prevention goals and non-depressed 
individuals’ stronger orientation toward promotion goals. 
The observed differences in response to goal priming were discernable even as the participants 
were actively engaged in a judgment task that was unrelated to goal pursuit. Analysis of the task-
related activation showed remarkably similar cortical responses in the two groups, including 
activity in executive, sensorimotor and visual areas, which are consistently associated with 
visual/verbal tasks requiring a motor response. Thus, the group differences in responses to goal 
priming could not be attributed to differences in task-related activation per se. 
These findings highlight both similarities and distinctions between social–cognitive and 
biobehavioral perspectives on motivation. Regulatory focus theory emphasizes the role of 
personal goal representations and social–cognitive processes underlying strategic pursuit of such 
goals, whereas biobehavioral models emphasize spatiotemporal approach/avoidance in response 
to more concrete, evolutionarily shaped cues for reward or punishment. A novel aspect of the 
current study is the use of idiographically selected goal priming materials. Just as previous 
research has suggested that certain dysfunctional cognitive processes in depression, like 
attention, are best probed using self-relevant stimuli (Mogg and Bradley, 2005), our findings 
suggest that standard laboratory stimuli intended to manipulate motivational states may not 
optimally probe dysfunctional personal goal pursuit. Furthermore, the current study showed that 
priming promotion or prevention goals induced activation in orbitofrontal regions previously 
implicated in representing critical aspects of goal pursuit, including the hedonic value of 
reinforcers, decision making, and performance monitoring (Kringelbach, 2005; Rolls, 2000). 
Thus, our findings also are consistent with recent theorizing about the role of the orbitofrontal 
cortex in depression (Drevets, 2007). 
Similar to Eddington et al. (2007), there was only a minimal increase in right OFC activation 
following prevention goal priming among the non-depressed participants. In contrast, the 
depressed patients showed a significant increase in right OFC activation when exposed to their 
own prevention goals. Furthermore, the magnitude of activation in the peak voxel from this 
cluster was correlated with severity of depressive symptoms, as indicated by HRSD scores, 
among the depressed patients.1 These findings parallel current theorizing regarding dysfunction 
of approach/avoidance mutual inhibition in unipolar depression (Watson,2005) and suggest that 
depression also may be characterized by hyperresponsivity to prevention goals, a motivational 
state potentially associated with hypervigilance, worry and anxiety symptoms. 
This study highlights the importance of integrating theoretical perspectives in an effort to gain a 
better understanding of motivational deficits associated with depression. Our findings indicate 
that motivational dysfunction in depression needs to be conceptualized at multiple levels of 
analysis and as involving multiple brain systems. Given the evidence underscoring the 
importance of cognitive processes in major depression, for example, it is surprising that few 
neuroimaging studies have compared predictions derived from cognitive (‘top-
down’) vs motivational (‘bottom-up’) models of depression. Neuroimaging methods are 
particularly useful for identifying both the unique and shared neural substrates underlying the 
dysfunctional systems defined by different etiological models. Such methods also enable 
researchers to test predictions about mechanisms of treatment-related change beyond traditional 
symptom measures. 
Several limitations of the current study suggest the need for further testing of our primary 
hypotheses in future research. First, although the pairwise group comparisons of 
promotion/prevention priming supported our hypotheses, the three-way interaction did not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, replication of our findings in a larger 
sample is needed. Second, while the use of idiographic, motivationally significant stimuli is one 
of the strengths of the current study, it also represents a limitation in that the SQ interview 
procedure prohibited the generation of large pools of goal words for each participant. In addition, 
the stimulus words for the current study were drawn from both the ‘own’ and the ‘significant 
other’ self-belief lists. There may be important differences in the cognitive, affective and 
motivational characteristics of goals that are strongly tied to others’ expectations for us 
compared to our expectations for ourselves, and differences in the sources used for the ‘other’ 
perspective may mediate the effects of goal priming (Burton et al., 2006; Shah, 2003). In future 
studies, an alternative method that combines idiographic and nomothetic approaches may yield a 
larger pool of stimuli that provides increased statistical power to detect priming-related 
differences and enables direct comparison between ‘self-standpoint’ vs ‘other-standpoint’ goals. 
We note several possible implications of our findings for the etiology and treatment of 
depression. Whether the observed deficit in left OFC activation following promotion goal 
priming is a cause or a consequence of depression, the mechanisms by which such a deficit is 
linked to affective and motivational processes in other brain areas need to be identified. 
Computational and neuroanatomical models of dopamine function in the PFC offer one possible 
set of mechanisms (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Dunlop and 
Nemeroff, 2007). Likewise, regardless of the causal status of this observed functional deficit, 
there is evidence that dysfunction of self-regulation is more clinically prominent in a subset of 
depressed patients. In a recent randomized trial, depressed patients manifesting chronic 
difficulties pursuing promotion goals showed significantly greater improvement in response to a 
psychotherapy targeting self-regulatory cognition than to standard cognitive therapy 
(Strauman et al., 2006). Additional studies examining changes in self-regulatory cognition and 
patterns of neural activation in response to goal priming after different treatments for depression 
will be useful in determining whether the attenuated priming response to promotion goals 
reported here may represent a biomarker for treatment selection (Roffman et al., 2005). 
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Footnotes 
1 Note that the correlation between activation in the right OFC voxel and severity of anxiety 
symptoms, as measured with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al., 1988) was positive but 
non-significant (r = 0.20,ns). 
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